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Abstract
Privacy on the Internet is becoming a concern as an already significant and ever growing part of
our daily activities is carried out online. While cryptography can be used to protect the integrity
and confidentiality of contents of communication, everyone along the route on which a packet is
traveling can still observe the addresses of the respective communication parties. This often is
enough to uniquely identify persons participating in a communication. Anonymous communica-
tion is used to hide relationships between the communicating parties. These relationships as well
as patterns of communication can often be as revealing as their content. Hence, anonymity is a
key technology needed to retain privacy in communications.
This paper provides a very brief overview of my doctoral dissertation “Anonymous Communi-
cation in the Age of the Internet” [2] and then concisely focuses on one randomly selected aspect,
namely, the attack on the anonymization concept called Crowds.
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1 Introduction: Brief Thesis Overview
The goal of the thesis “Anonymous Communication in the Age of the Internet” [2] is to
enhance the state-of-the-art in the field of anonymous communication and to contribute to a
broader understanding of the topic and its primitives within the community of researchers as
well as to create solid fundamentals for future designs of the systems empowering users with
tools for strengthening their privacy protection on the Internet.
We first propose a practical attacker model for risk analysis in anonymous communication.
We justify the applicability of the model by an analysis of the strength of anonymizing
techniques compared to each other as well as some widely known attacks on them. We then
present the design and evaluation of a novel lightweight anonymization protocol based purely
on open standards. It significantly outperforms other existing approaches for anonymization
while only slightly sacrificing the level of provided protection. We next propose and analyze
two innovative approaches for scalable distribution of information about anonymization
networks. They have security properties similar to a centralized directory, but scale gracefully
and do not require trust in any third party. We use analytical models and simulations to
validate our approaches. We also consider performance issues of anonymization networks.
To this end we develop and evaluate path selection metrics for performance-improved onion
routing. The results show that applying our methods, users can obtain a significant increase
in performance without harming their anonymity. Alternatively, users can get a dramatic
performance boost with little sacrifice in anonymity. We provide a practical approach to
empirically analyze the strength of anonymity different methods of path selection provide
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in comparison to each other. Finally, we investigate several attacks against anonymous
communication systems. Most notably, we present a traffic analysis attack against encrypted
HTTP streams sent through different anonymizers with surprising results showing the
effectiveness and ease of website identification in encrypted channels transferred through
the commonly used anonymizers. Moreover, we show under which conditions and how
innocent-looking application layer data can be used to speed up traditional attacks that are
targeted at the network layer identification of a user’s communication partners. We also
propose and analyze different countermeasures hampering these attacks.
2 Crowds
Crowds [5] is a peer-to-peer system for anonymous web browsing. It is based on a simple
randomized routing protocol, in which all participants forward messages on behalf of other
users as well as their own. Crowds provides security by means of increased path length and
was meant to be a trade-off between performance and security. The main idea of Crowds is
to hide each user’s communications by routing them randomly within a group of similar users
(“blending into a crowd”). When a user requests a web page, he sends the request to another
(randomly chosen) crowd member (called a jondo). Upon receiving such a request, this jondo
(and, if any, all consecutive) decides whether to forward the message to the final destination
or to another randomly chosen jondo by making a biased coin toss. More formally, the
message is forwarded to its final destination with probability 1−pf , or to some other random
participant with probability pf . Communication between jondos is encrypted, however each
of them sees the content of passing messages, including the address of the final destination.
The final request to the server is usually sent in plain.
3 Predecessor Attack on Crowds
Due to the fact that the message initiator always forwards messages to a randomly chosen
node, but all consecutive nodes only with a certain probability, there exist an information
leakage in the system: the one who forwards a message to a colluding jondo is more suspicious
to be the message initiator than any other honest jondo. In the following we will show how
to make use of this information leakage in order to deanonymize the users.
Let n + c be the size of the crowd, c is the number of colluding jondos and pf is the
probability of forwarding in the system as defined in [5]. n+ c and pf are system parameters
known to everyone, while c is known only to the adversary.
Let ph denote the probability that a colluding jondo receives a message directly from the
path initiator1. Let pl denote the probability for one honest jondo, which is not the initiator,
to forward the message to a colluding jondo (note that ph + (n− 1) · pl = 1). The interested
reader is referred to [2, 3] for the details how to calculate the probabilities ph and pl.
Because of the information leakage mentioned above, ph > pl for all admissible parameter
values [2]. This fact can be used by an attacker to make precise statements about the users’
peers. We assume that the attacker participates in the crowd with c jondos (c ≥ 1) and,
without loss of generality, only stores the passing communication to a single external entity,
namely Bob. In this section we will show how to estimate the amount of communication that
each honest user initiated with Bob. The estimation can be performed with an arbitrary
precision [2].
1 h stands for “high”, l for “low”
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Figure 1 Information flow for the attacker: matrix M
From the adversary’s point of view, there are n jondos that are sending messages to
Bob, each with its own average rate λi ≥ 0 per time interval. We model these as Poisson
processes Ai = Pλi for i ∈ 1 . . . n. This kind of arrival distribution is in our opinion a fair
trade-off between the analytical complexity and realism. Herewith we want to provide a first
approximation which can be further refined by modeling arrivals in a more sophisticated
manner. The colluding entities observe on average the following number of messages to Bob
per time interval from the i-th system member:
E[msg to Bob from i] = ph · λi + 1− ph
n− 1 ·
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
λj (1)
With the help of the following matrix M , we can model the number of messages Oi
arriving at the attacker from jondo i to Bob:
M =

ph pl · · · pl
pl ph · · · pl
...
...
...
pl pl · · · ph
 (2)
Oi =
∑n
j=1 Pmi,jλj (3)
The observations can be seen as a vector of messages (each element is the number of
messages received from the corresponding jondo by colluding members and addressed to
Bob), which is a product of the vector of actually sent messages with the matrix M (see
Figure 1). The thickness of the line corresponds to the sending rate of the corresponding
user (the thicker it is, the higher is the sending rate). Note that the missing line from one
of the users on the right-hand side means that he does not send own messages, but rather
only forwards some on behalf of the others (which corresponds to the thin line pointing to
colluding users). Since Oi is a sum of the Poisson processes, it is also a Poisson process with
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the following properties:
Oi = Pωi for ωi =
n∑
j=1
mi,jλj (4)
E[Oi] = V [Oi] = ωi (5)
Because the cardinality of ωi depends on the value of the λi, from the observations of Oi
it is possible to draw conclusions about the λi (for t→∞):
(ω1, . . . , ωn) =M(λ1, . . . , λn) (6)
⇐⇒ (λ1, . . . , λn) =M−1(ω1, . . . , ωn) (7)
Indeed, the matrix M is invertible to M−1 because Crowds is unable to provide perfect
security (ph 6= pl), thus:
M−1 =

p˜h p˜l · · · p˜l
p˜l p˜h · · · p˜l
...
...
...
p˜l p˜l · · · p˜h
 (8)
p˜h = n+ph−2nph−1 (9)
p˜l = ph−1nph−1 (10)
Under the common values for pf , n, and c (0 < pf < 1, n  c) the following inequalities
hold: p˜h > 0 and p˜l < 0.
Having observed ωi, it is thus possible to calculate an estimation for the λi, namely λ˜i,
as follows:
λ˜i =
n∑
j=1
m−1i,jωj (11)
Using Chernoff style bound for the probability that a Poisson process deviates from its
mean, it is even possible to calculate the number of observations needed in order to estimate
sending rates λi with any desired precision. The interested reader is referred to [2] for further
details.
4 Predecessor Attack Speed-Up: Cross-Layer Attack
The classical predecessor attack presented above aims to identify a user’s peer partners at
the network layer only. We will show in this section that finding a user’s peer partners by a
predecessor attack can be sped up by building an extensive user profile on the application
layer in parallel, i.e., identifying values of different communication attributes.
While a user typically communicates with many arbitrary peers, his application layer
profile (set of accepted languages, browser version, etc.) remains usually the same. The
required number of observations to confirm (identify) with arbitrary precision user Ai’s peer
partner B proportionally depends on the message rate from Ai to B observed by colluding
users [2]. The same is valid for the application layer profile. Therefore, an attacker will
discover the application layer profile of his victim much faster than the communication profile.
If the attacker is using a statistical attack on the network layer, he can then use information
from the application layer to bias the input for the network layer attack, e.g., by filtering out
improbable combinations or in general, messages that do not fit to the victim’s profile.
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Figure 2 Cross-layer information flow
Figure 2 illustrates how the attack works: at first a user’s application layer profile is
built applying the classical predecessor attack – but rather on application layer data. This
information is further used in order to refine the classical attack on the network layer: the
feedback is given to improve the observations which are used as an input to the attack on
the traffic layer [2, 4].
After the profiles of users are built, it is possible to use the same data in order to identify
the user’s peer partners. Actually, even during the process of building the application layer
profile, the calculations for the network layer can already be adapted on the fly. We propose
two attacks using application layer data that work as follows:
combined attack: the classical predecessor attack (as described in the previous section) is
applied only for messages matching the profile;
cross-layer attack: same as above, but additionally pnewh and pnewl are used instead of ph
and pl. pnewh is the probability that Ai is the originator of the message, given that the
message is received from Ai by an attacker and that it has a corresponding application
layer attribute. Similarly, pnewl =
1−pnewh
n−1 .
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the new attacks we have performed simulations.
The simulations are done as follows: every honest user has exactly two random communication
peers. These two peers do not change during the whole simulation run. In each round every
honest user sends between 0 and 3 messages to each of his communication peers. On the
application layer, we used a single attribute with 7 possible values of the attribute in the
communication profile (e.g., accepted languages in an HTTP request).
Figure 3 shows the simulation results including 95% confidence intervals in the 2D plot.
Both of the introduced attacks are significantly more precise than the original network
layer attack. We found out that the advantage of our attacks is higher for networks with a
lower fraction of colluding members. For the considered scenario the accuracy is improved
by a factor of 3. An interesting finding is that up to the forwarding probability of 0.86
the cross-layer attack is more precise than the combined one. However, for pf ≥ 0.86 the
combined attack is more accurate. These results can be observed in Figure 3a.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
We showed how the information leakage in Crowds can be used in order to deanonymize
its users. We also showed that enriching network layer information with innocent-looking
KiVS’11
226 Anonymous Communication in the Digital World
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Av
er
ag
e
Er
ro
r
Forwarding Probability (pf )
Measurements for n = 10, c = 3, 1 attribute
with 7 occurring values and 200 repetitions per pf
Network Layer Attack
Combined Attack
Cross-Layer Attack
(a) Different values of forwarding probability
50100
150200 50100150200
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
Measurement results for c = 2, pf = 0.6,
200 repetitions per n and # of rounds
Av
er
ag
e
Er
ro
r
Cross-Layer Attack
Network Layer Attack
Number of honest users (n) Number of rounds
(b) Growing no. of observation rounds
Figure 3 Cross-layer attack: simulation results
application layer data (e.g., browser strings in HTTP requests) can be used to significantly
increase accuracy and speed up traditional attacks targeted at the network layer only. It is
naïve to think that an attacker would not make use of all the information which is available.
Hence, information from both network and application layer has to be considered in future
research in order to provide usable and realistic metrics for anonymity.
The attack speed-up can be circumvented if the filtering system on the application layer
would substitute the identifying information from the browser with the known statistical
distribution of the browser data like, e.g., [1]. To be even more unidentifiable, one could
observe the communication of the others as an attacker does, and calculate this statistic on
his own. This is due to the reason that distribution of identifying information among the
users in anonymizing networks may be different from those on the Internet in general.
The network layer attack itself, however, cannot be circumvented completely. Crowds leaks
routing information under any admissible parameter values [2]. The number of observations
needed to determine the sending rate of the users in the crowd precisely enough can be
relatively small [2]. This rises a reasonable doubt on the possibility of using the system for
strong anonymity in an open environment.
For more information about this and other topics around anonymous communication, the
interested reader is referred to [2].
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